Decentralising energy governance? Wales, devolution and the politics of energy infrastructure decision-making by Cowell, Richard John Westley
This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional
repository: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/88323/
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication.
Citation for final published version:
Cowell, Richard John Westley 2016. Decentralising energy governance? Wales, devolution and the
politics of energy infrastructure decision-making. Environment and Planning C: Government and
Policy 10.1177/0263774X16629443 file 
Publishers page: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0263774X16629443
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0263774X16629443>
Please note: 
Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page
numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please
refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite
this paper.
This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies. See 
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications
made available in ORCA are retained by the copyright holders.
1 
 
Decentralising energy governance? Wales, devolution and the 
politics of energy infrastructure decision-making 
 
 
Richard Cowell 
 
School of Planning and Geography 
Cardiff University 
Glamorgan Building 
King Edward VII Avenue 
Cardiff, UK 
CF10 3WA 
 
cowellrj@cardiff.ac.uk 
+44 (0)29 20876684 
 
  
2 
 
Decentralising energy governance? Wales, devolution and the 
politics of energy infrastructure decision-making 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Much can be learned about the scope for changing the trajectory of energy system 
development by examining the effects of governance re-scaling, and how this is negotiated 
by prevailing regimes of energy provision. To advance this proposition, this paper uses 
Barry’s concept of ‘technological zones’to analyse how devolution within the British state, to 
Wales has affected the politicisation and organisation of electricityinfrastructure decisions. 
The evidence presentedcentres on arguments about energy governance and devolution in 
two government inquiries. While logics of democratic accountability to Wales were 
asserted, along with argumentsfor more territorially integrated approaches to energy 
infrastructure decisions, the more dominant discourse emphasised swift and stable 
procedures to facilitate major investment and infrastructure delivery. The researchshows 
that while intensifying place-based conflicts and pressures for governance re-scaling 
potentially disrupt the reproduction of infrastructural systems they do not automatically do 
so, which should direct our attention to the conditions which shape their politicisation. 
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1.0 Introduction 
On 11
th
 May 2011, approximately 1500 people gathered on the steps of the National 
Assembly for Wales in Cardiff, the Senedd, protesting againstproposals to build 
numerouslarge wind farms and high voltage grid lines across tracts of rural Wales. 
Speakersaddressing the crowd drew analogies with previous rounds of exploitative resource 
development in Wales, notably the flooding of the Tryweryn Valley to create a reservoir to 
supply England with water, and questioned the appropriateness of the proposals: "Are we 
going to let them turn rural Wales into one gigantic power plant?"
1
 The Welsh Government
2
 
defended their hand in the developments
3
 – it was their planning strategy, ‘Technical Advice 
Note 8’ (WAG 2005), thathad encouraged the concentration of wind power into particular 
rural areas – and sought to contain the potential impacts(NAWESC 2012; Mason and 
Milbourne 2014). Threading through thecontroversy was the ambiguous issue of 
responsibility. At that time, the Welsh Government was not then responsible for consenting 
most major energy infrastructure projects,a situation presented by Welsh Ministers as 
intolerable: ‘(w)e cannot accept a position where decisions made outside Wales will lead to 
inappropriate development for the people of Wales’.
4
 
On a prima facie basis, these events further illustrate the difficulties of promoting 
sustainable forms of energy. There is near-universal support for the replacement of carbon-
intensive fossil fuels with other technologies, like renewables, but also recognition that such 
transitions present significant societal and political challenges (Verbong and Loorbach 
2012). Also widely acknowledged is the challenge oforchestrating change across multiple 
governancescales; eachassociated with differing powers and territorial jurisdictions 
(Sovacool and Brown 2009; Goldthau 2014a). 
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However, two aspects of these challenges have beenless well studied. First, as Moss (2014) 
suggests, most transitions analysts focus on tracing energy system changes and treat the 
political context as something to be navigated; relatively few consider ‘how ... infrastructure 
policy gets caught up in, and shaped by, broader, multi-scalar processes of national or even 
international politics’ (2014, 1436; Hodson and Marvin 2013). This is an important omission, 
given that the intersections of government re-scaling and energy pathways can be revealing 
(Cowell et al 2015). One might expect the shifting territorialisation of governmentto disrupt 
energy systems, by providing opportunities to challenge the goals, practices, mechanisms 
and actorsthat govern them. Alternatively, if prevailing systems can accommodate such 
potential disruptions, this enhances our understanding of howcertain modes of provision 
maintain their dominance.Second, the protests at the Seneddshould prompt us to theorise 
more carefully about how infrastructure siting and consenting canaffectthe politics of 
energy system change.  
These gaps in current knowledge set the objectives for this paper, which seeks to extend our 
understanding of energy transitions by examining the intersection between governance re-
scaling, energy infrastructure development and politics. Its specific focus is the governance 
of energy infrastructure and devolution in the UK and Wales in particular. Attention is 
focused on electricity– new generating plant and grid networks –because electricity 
infrastructure epitomises material obduracy in energy systems yet is also embroiled in 
contested conceptions of future sustainability. Agendas favouringbulk power models (Szarka 
2007), requiring the reproduction and expansion of industrial-scale electricity supply 
infrastructure unfold alongside arguments for decentralised systems, smaller-scale facilities 
and greater demand management (Goldthau 2014). There is also under-exploited analytical 
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value in locating theresearch within processes of political devolution, as observable across 
the British state since 1998. Typically, devolution is seen as impacting the vertical hierarchy 
of government; for example inserting a new tier of elected government for Wales.However, 
tracing the actual effects of devolution on the development of energy infrastructure can 
reveal the fragmentary nature of democratic control over technological systems at any 
given level. 
Conceptually, an analytical framework is required that can interpret how technologies 
become political andhow the (re)territorialisation of infrastructural systems such as energy 
interfaces with the (re)territorialisation of formal political institutions like the state. The 
analysis here draws on the work of Andrew Barry (2001, 2002, 2006, 2013a, 2013b), 
especially his concept of ‘technological zones’ (2002, 2006). As this paper seeks to 
demonstrate, efforts to assert control over energy infrastructure in Wales should not be 
seen as just about hierarchies of formal control, but about the messy processes of creating 
governance boundaries within previously more homogenous technological zones, and 
whether doing so has effects that are political, in that they bring infrastructural objects into 
contingency and debate (Kuzemko 2014; Barry 2001). 
The paper is structured as follows. After explaining the conceptual framework in more 
detail, the analysis proceeds to examine the data from Wales, focusing on a particular 
contentious issue: the question of who – the Welsh Government or the UK Government – 
should have the power to determine consents for major new electricity infrastructure 
(power stations and grid networks)?It begins byexamining the Welsh Government’s efforts 
to steer wind energy developmentwithin its territory, and how connections between 
changing governance processes and industry decisions createda crisisthat increasingly 
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politicised the allocation of powers. This is followed by a discourse analysis of 
argumentation around the potential devolution of energy infrastructure consenting 
powers.The conclusion offer wider reflections on the intersection between energy 
transitions and governance re-scaling. 
 
2.0 Understanding technologies, scale and the political 
2.1 Scale in energy governance 
Issues arising from the intersection of scientific and technical practices, their materialities 
and territorialisation have become of increased interest to a range of scholars (Marres and 
Lezaun 2011). This can be seen amongst energy researchers, and the recognition that 
understanding transitions in energy systems requires a grasp of the spatial dimensionsof 
change (Bridge et al 2013).Truffer and Coenen (2012) propose that the socio-technical 
regimes that constitute systems of energy provision should not be seen as monolithically 
coterminous with state structures but as cutting across and connecting different territories 
and scales, therebyunevenly distributingopportunities for actions that may stabilise or 
destabilise them (see also van der Vleuten and Hogselius 2012). This clearly affects the 
governance of energy systems, with governance understood as ‘the institutions, 
mechanisms and processes through which … authority is exercised’ (Goldthau 2014, 135). 
Nevertheless in seeking to connecttechnological governance, scale and politics, there can be 
a tendency to conceptualise these three elementsmainly in terms of multi-level governance 
i.e. to the distribution of powers betweenvertically and horizontally demarcated 
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institutions. Such frameworksmay help describethe distribution of authority, but questions 
remain about how to connect authority, territorial reach and the political. 
Such issues are important within the emerging literature on ‘techno-politics’, concerned 
withthe connections between politics and technology or technical practices (Barry 2013a; 
Kama 2014). Theorists are responding inter aliato the ways in which the work ofFoucault 
and Latour, while offering useful tools for understanding the constitution of governance, 
have relatively little to say about political conflict (Barry 2001). Key questions concern the 
ways in which artefacts or practices become objects of contestation, how and where they 
become politicised, and how technologies play a role in (re)shaping the space of 
government. 
One set of tools for addressing these questions is offered by Barry’s concept of 
‘technological zones’ (Barry 2001). These zones are new spaces of rule, within which steps 
have been taken to reduce differences between technical practices, procedures and forms, 
thus enabling comparisons, connections and the circulation of particular entities. They are, 
in effect, a governance device. In subsequent development of the idea, Barry (2006) 
proposed that ‘technological zones’can take a number of forms, each serving to stabilise 
andenable the spatial extension of governance (see Table 1). 
[Insert Table 1 somewhere near here] 
Many applications of technological zones have focused on metrological and infrastructural 
zone. For example, Barry’s own work has analysed efforts to harmonise European Union air 
quality standards (2001), with Faulkner (2009) charting the struggles to form a technological 
zone around tissue engineering regulation in the EU. Applications of technological zone 
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concepts to physical energy infrastructure are few but insightful, in suggesting how 
infrastructure construction and governance negotiates the exigencies of diverse 
settings.Willow and Wylie (2014) use technological zones to describe how fracking 
regulation insulates extraction practices from surrounding contexts. Kama (2014) used these 
conceptsto  show how electricity connections between the Baltic states and 
Russiaaffectedthe design of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) (see also Barry 2013a). 
Applying technological zones offers a number of useful perspectives. One important facet is 
that technological zoneshave their own geographies, and may not necessarily be 
coterminous with national political territory (Faulkner 2009) or undifferentiated 
globalisation(Barry 2006, 239; Ong and Collier 2005). National governments can remain 
important actors in their construction - Kama (2014) shows the extension of carbon markets 
being brought into conflict with state sovereignty claims –but technological zones are not 
automatically territorially continuous or uniform(Barry 2001).Barry is also clear that 
theconstruction and extension of technological zones can be precarious, and these 
vulnerabilities can offer insights for analysts of change. By seeking to render things similar, 
they can constrain the identity of objects within them and therebyencounter resistance, 
both passive (from the material elements already in place) and active, social resistance 
(Barry 2006). Precariousness derives from the fact that technological zones are always a 
potentially fragile abstraction from the multiplicity of elements, forms and processes 
beyond the network, and with which they are in ‘contingent, uneasy and unstable 
interrelationships’ (Ong and Collier 2005, 12, cited in Barry 2006, 250). 
Boundaries may be especially problem-prone (Kama 2014). Faulker (2009) explains how 
boundaries are intrinsic to the construction of technological zones, to define participants 
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and make associations between them possible, but also simultaneously (and often 
contentiously), creating new distinctions with non-participants. At the ends of technological 
zones, in such boundary areas, where power as translation (Latour 1986) becomes more 
contested and ambiguous (Barry 2013b, 429), one is more likely to encounter different 
perspectives: ‘uncertainties and anxieties about what may be possible or desirable’ (Barry 
2001, 52). Technological zones are always therefore needing renegotiation and repair, and 
boundaries can be a particular focus for such work. Moreover, whereas Barry tends to 
present metrological zones, infrastructural zones and zones of qualification as different 
forms, it is useful to see something like a system of energy provision as a composite, 
bundling together different forms of technological zone, each with different reach and 
vulnerabilities. 
One can seehow the ‘development and extension of technological zones’ becomes‘an 
increasingly critical site for political negotiation and conflict’ (Barry 2006, 250).But to 
recognise this entails delineating carefully how, when and where technologies acquire 
political effects (Marres and Lezaun 2011). An important dynamic is the extent to which 
actors involved are able to contain potentialpoliticization.  Following Barry (2002), 
politicization and depoliticization are not straightforwardly equivalent to placing 
deliberations inside and outside respectively of the arenas of formal political institutions. If 
‘the political’ is seen as ‘an index of the space of contestation’ (Barry 2001, 194), then one 
can see how the machineries of (formal)politics can facilitate smooth governance. After all, 
politics can serve .both ‘contestation and the containment of contestation’ (Barry 2002, 
p.270; Smith and Stirling 2007), accomplished by ‘placing limits on the possibilities for 
debate and confrontation’ (op cit.). This nexus between infrastructure and the political 
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offers opportunities to more closely connect analyses of energy system transitions and 
political processes. 
 
 
2.2 Siting conflicts and infrastructural development 
 
There is a surprising void in existing research between analyses of energy transitionsand the 
construction of new infrastructure and their associatedprocesses of siting, planning and 
consenting.Publicopposition to new energy facilitieshas long-generated research into ‘siting 
controversies’ (Gregory 1971), yet muchof this positions such controversiessimply as 
problems to solve (Aitken 2010), rarelyquestioning how processes of siting and consenting 
new infrastructure relate to the wider reproduction of systems of provision. The energy 
transitions literature meanwhilerarely gives prominence to infrastructuresiting (though see 
Murphy and Smith 2013); reflecting perhaps a tendency to focus on technological 
innovation (Cooke 2010).However, the history of energy development is full of instances 
where siting conflicts over new facilities become fulcrums for the wider contestation of the 
direction of development (e.g.Owens 1985; Sovacool and Cooper 2013). 
To connect infrastructure siting more centrally with issues of development trajectory, we 
might turn to a particular form (or dimension) of technological zones – ‘zones of 
qualification’; the processes of evaluation and transparency created to ensure that the 
qualities of objects and practices can be assessed, against more or less common criteria 
(Barry 2001). Amongst Barry’s concepts, zones of qualification have received less attention 
from researchers, and their application to the consenting processes surrounding energy 
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infrastructure requires care. In conjunction with the creation of standard systems of 
assessment, zones of qualification also often require openness to external input, validation 
and scrutiny as well as expert, technicalanalysis (Barry 2006). So, processes for assessing the 
impacts of new energy facilities may include provision for consulting affected communities, 
representative institutions, and expert bodies. Moreover, consenting processes often 
bundle together multiple zones of qualification: - environmental impact assessment, 
planning consent, pollution control etc. The challenge in viewing these kinds of processes as 
zones of qualification is the difficulties entailed in making such processes consistent across 
space, requiring as they do (i) the evaluation of specific projects and their impacts in relation 
to diverse heterogeneous contextual conditions, (ii) often through procedures that are 
decentralised (e.g. operated by local or multiple governments), in which (iii) the need to 
weigh different kinds of impacts makes discretion difficult to eradicate.  One can see the 
challenges that zones of qualification represent to the smooth operation of technological 
zones. Indeed, it helpsexplain why land use planning in the UK is often represented, 
pejoratively, as a ‘blockage’ to the delivery of ‘necessary’ energy infrastructure (Ellis et al 
2009). 
What can make infrastructure development particularly problematic is that infrastructure 
projects can render otherwise abstract policies for energy delivery, decarbonisation or 
markets into more visible, tangible forms, making them a key moment for public 
engagement and the potential politicisation of the underlying policy (Hajer 2003; Callon et al 
2009; Owens and Cowell 2010). However, such processes do not necessarily become 
political. Zones of qualification such as consenting procedures are also domains in which 
much effort is made to stage and channel debate. Governments may act to parametise 
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decisions, perhaps to give pre-eminence to particular spatial and qualitative standards for 
the acceptability of development (Barry 2006; Aitkenet al 2008). They may pull decisions 
into arenas that are more or less likely to admit diverse considerations to enter decisions. 
Indeed, moves have been underway in an array of countries to ‘streamline’ decision-making 
for major infrastructure, by instituting strict time frames for stages of the process, or 
debarring discussion of ‘need’ in individual project consenting (Cowell and Owens 2006).  
We can see therefore how the multiplicity of elements potentially brought into contention 
in infrastructure decision-making means that stabilising and standardising zones of 
qualification is problematic.Struggle may be especially likely where technological zones 
encounter shifting political jurisdictions, which bring new pressures to bear on their spatial 
extension and organisation. This can be shown from the empirical focus of this paper, where 
devolution precipitated a re-territorialisation of zones of qualification around electricity 
network development that previously extended across England and Wales, with uncertain 
and contested consequences. 
 
 
3.0 Methodology 
The research presented heretraces the efforts of the Welsh Governmentto steer major 
electricity infrastructure development within its territory. The electricity supply system of 
the UK is highly complex, interlacing practices for generating and distributing electricity with 
supply and other services, and the focus here is on a specific aspect: the incorporation of 
new renewable electricity generation infrastructures, especially on-shore wind, and 
associated network connections. Conflicts around wind energy development helped set the 
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agenda for two major inquiries: the National Assembly for Wales Environment and 
Sustainability Committee Inquiry into Energy Policy and Planning in Wales (hereafter the 
NAWInquiry), that ran from July 2011 and reported in June 2012, and the Commission on 
Devolution in Wales (hereafter the Silk Commission), which was established in October 2011 
and finished reporting in March 2014.
5
 How to address a mounting sense of mismatch 
between the impacts of energy infrastructure development inWales, and the powers of the 
Welsh Government to control them,attracted discussion in each.  
The research draws on two sets of data. The main set is data from the two inquiries, taken 
from submitted written evidence, minutes and transcripts of the cross-examination of 
expert witnesses, and final inquiry reports.
6
 This is supplemented by twenty-five semi-
structured interviews conducted between 2007 and 2013 with senior figures from 
government in Wales, the electricity industry, environmental bodies and community groups. 
Together these sources allowed a discourse analysis to be conducted of the arguments 
circulating around the potential rescaling of energy infrastructure consenting powers and 
the qualities this zone of qualification should exhibit: who did the various parties believe to 
be best placed to govern energy infrastructure development in Wales, and why?; how 
should decision-making processes be exercised, and what does this reveal about the logics 
that hold the system of provision together? By following these inquiries through to their 
conclusions and outcomes, it can be observedwhich arguments (and actors)exerted greatest 
leverage. 
 
4.0 Renewable electricity infrastructurein Wales 
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4.1 The creation of crisis 
For most of the twentieth century, the history of electricity infrastructure development in 
Wales could be summarised as the creation of technological zones – metrological, 
infrastructural and of qualification - characterised by accreting technical and political 
integration with England. Under nationalisation, key powers for electricity governance were 
held by the UK central government, with grid and generation infrastructuredelivered by 
nationalised industries that treated England and Wales as a single system. Privatisation from 
the end of the 1980s fragmented these arrangements, but central government retained 
control of key policy levers, either directly or via oversight of national market regulators.  
One sphere of continuity concerned the power to issue consents for major electricity 
infrastructure–defined as major grid lines and electricity generating stations over 50MW – 
which was retained by central government. This scalar demarcation was never justified with 
precision, but its principal basis was that ’major’ infrastructure was ‘nationally important’ 
(at UK level), and needed to be determined centrallyto ensure coherent electricity system 
development, including security of supply. Consents for generation projects below 50MW 
were determined in a more decentralised fashion by local planning authorities. 
Since 1998 Wales has been entrained in a process of political devolution, along with 
Northern Ireland and Scotland, as an elected assembly – the National Assembly for Wales - 
took responsibility for functions previously exercised through Secretaries of State for Wales 
(Ministers of the UK Government). However, Wales receivedthe most limited devolution 
settlementof these territories (Cooke and Clifton 2005).By and large, the powers that had 
accumulated incrementally under successive Secretaries of State were handed to the NAW, 
with little discussion(Rawlings 2005).As these never included responsibilities for energy 
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policy, so the Assembly acquired few significant powers in the energy sphere, except where 
it intersected with competencies inplanning and economic development that were devolved 
(see Table 2, below). Nevertheless, devolution created untidy new fractures within the zone 
of qualificationfor energy infrastructure consenting, with responsibilitydividedbetween 
Welsh and UK Governmentsdepending on project size (megawatts of installed capacity) and 
location (see Table 3). 
[Put Table 2 somewhere here] 
[Put Table 3 somewhere here] 
That this ragged distribution of responsibilities prompted little deliberation in 1998 may 
reflect then prevailing political beliefs that privatisation had depoliticised electricity, 
rendering it a normal commodity that markets could organise. Such beliefs proved short-
lived (Kuzemko 2014).As elsewhere, successive Welsh Governments became exercised by 
wider agendas of cutting greenhouse gas emissionsas well asdomestic challenges of 
reconciling renewable energy expansionwith environmental protection, rural diversification 
and economic development. This problematisation of energy drove a desire to intervene. 
Welsh Governments created a series of energy strategies, mostly seeking to‘maximise(s) the 
potential for renewable energy in Wales’
7
 by attracting significant new investment (Welsh 
Government 2010; 2012; Hodson and Marvin 2013), but it has been difficulties arising in the 
planning and consenting of renewable energy infrastructure that have most politicised 
energy within Wales, and in turn pressurised the devolution settlement. 
By the mid-1990s, rural Wales had become an important focus for wind farm development, 
but increasing public opposition led to a declining proportion of projects receiving consent 
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from local planning authorities (McKenzie-Hedger 1994).Inheriting this problematic 
situation, the Welsh Government sought to use one of the key tools at its disposal – its 
powers over planning policy - to create strategic-scale spatial policy guidancethat would 
reconcile desires to expand renewables with the containment of environmental impacts. 
The drivers and problematic process of creating this policy have been explained elsewhere 
(Cowell 2007; Stevenson 2009) and will not be repeated here. The resulting policy guidance 
– Technical Advice Note 8: Renewable Energy – was issued in 2005 (WAG 2005), and two 
elements are especially important for the analysis here: 
• It demarcated on a map of Wales seven ‘Strategic Search Areas’ (SSAs) in which there 
was to be a presumption in favour of large-scale wind energy schemes (25MW or 
more), with restrictions on such developments elsewhere (see Figure 1); 
• It was suggested that these SSAs together could accommodate at least 800MW of new 
capacity, to help meet the (then) 2010 renewable energy targets; 
 
[Insert Figure 1 somewhere near here] 
The Welsh Government could not (then) alter the fact that actual consenting powers 
remained with local and national government levels,but rather used TAN8 to add additional 
spatial tests for the acceptability of large-scale on-shore wind projects. Viewing it as a zone 
of qualification (after Barry 2006), alerts us to the way in which the TAN8 zoning strategy 
sought to impart certainty and consistency to corporate investment and planning decisions 
on larger wind projects across Welsh territory. However, if certainty and consistency were 
the goal,the material form of industryresponses to TAN8, the public reactions and central 
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government actions destabilised the demarcationsand judgements around which TAN8 had 
been constructed.  
Wind energy developers were initially hostile to the way in which TAN8 served to restrict 
their sitingoptions, but ultimately channelled a significant number of large-scale wind farm 
proposals towards the SSAs. Projects totalling more than 2000MW of capacity were put 
forward, leading the Welsh Government to increase its aspirations for development of this 
technology by 2020 (WAG 2010). If stabilising the conditions for wind farm investment was 
a key goal of setting up the SSAs, then ‘(t)hose lines have served their purpose’
8
. This up-
scaling arose from the availabilityof higher capacityturbines deployed in larger wind farm 
projects.  
However, the mounting scale of electricity infrastructure development generated effects 
that also increased the intensity and reach of opposition. Consultation on the draft TAN8 
policy in 2004-5 had attracted significant criticism from individuals, communities and 
countryside NGOs concerned about wind energy projects concentrating in the SSAs (Cowell 
2007). Discontent increased again as actual wind farm proposals came forward, but became 
particularly intense once it became apparent that connecting this new capacity to the grid 
could require major new high voltage lines. This ‘brought a whole new constituency into the 
debate’
9
, beyond the visual envelopes of the SSAs. Protests at theSenedd were just part of 
wider actions, as opposition groups challenged the wind farm and grid infrastructure 
proposals in the consenting process, thus triggering public inquiries, while also acting on 
formal political institutions. In mid-Wales, protesters were successful in fomenting electoral 
change as politicians at local, Assembly and UK levelfell to candidatescritical of wind energy, 
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strengthening the challenge at UK level to the wider governmental support for on-shore 
wind. 
Pervading the conflict was significant ambiguity about responsibility. The Welsh 
Government’s interventions were clearly causal in the emergenceof large concentrations of 
wind energy in mid-Wales, but the up-scaling of projects stimulated in part by their spatial 
strategy meant that much of the capacity coming forward was in projects over 50MW and 
thus would be determined by central government, not Welsh local planning authorities. The 
Welsh Government responded to the controversy by announcing caps on the wind power 
capacity that each SSA should accommodate, only to cause panic among wind energy 
developers and raise further questions about the Welsh Government’s power to act. 
This ambiguity was magnifiedby perceptions that the UK government was largely 
unresponsive to ideas that Welsh institutions should steer energy infrastructure 
development. For the UK, energy remained an exceptional category of development in the 
context of devolution. When the 2008 Planning Act instituted ‘fast-track’ processes for 
consenting major infrastructure, most of its provisions (for transport projects, waste 
management facilities etc.) applied only to England,except for electricity infrastructure, 
where they also applied in Wales. Furthermore, to guide consenting under the 2008 Act 
process, central government released National Policy Statements, identified as ‘the primary 
decision-making policy document ... on nationally significant’  infrastructure in England and 
Wales’ (DECC 2011b, para 1.5.1).Although the NPS on renewable energy expressed the 
expectationthat applicants would take policies like TAN8 ‘into account when working up 
their proposals’:  
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‘(w)hether an application conforms to the guidance or the targets will not, in itself, be 
a reason for approving or rejecting the application’ (para 2.2.1). 
The significance of this statement has been much debated. Certainly, the Welsh 
Government, in their NAW Inquiry evidence, represented it as allowing UK decision-makers 
to‘ignore’TAN8. Arguably, the text above exposes the longer-standing but previously latent 
divergence of rationalities that underpinned the overlapping zones of qualification in 
England and Wales. Whereas Welsh Governments have been supportive of spatial steering 
by the state, UK central governments have traditionallyseen such action as undesirable 
interference in the siting decisions of commercial actors (e.g. DECC 2011a, p.27).For UK 
central government, a strategic logic of market decisions and system security should be pre-
eminent in adjudication of major energy infrastructure consents, coupled to an enduring 
doctrine of reviewing each application ‘on its merits’, and which oughtnot to be pre-empted 
by compliance with planning policies. However, by making this divergence in rationales (and 
their hierarchical relationship) more explicit, the NPS also made them more susceptible to 
argument. 
 
4.2 Arguments aboutchange 
Welsh Government politicians had regularlyquestionedWales’s limitedconsenting powers 
over major energy infrastructure and made requests to central government for 
change.
10
Such requests were always rebuffed. By 2011, however, the mounting controversy 
around wind and grid infrastructure intensified pressure for change. As a result, the 
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distribution of decision-making powers between England and Wales became a key question 
at two inquiries. 
NAW Energy Policy Inquiry 
The first inquiry was an opportunity for Assembly Membersto respond to the mounting 
controversy and scrutinise energy and planning policies in Wales. In practice, the NAW 
Environment and Sustainability Committee framed the inquiry questions in instrumental 
terms: ‘what are the implications for Wales if responsibility for consenting major onshore 
and offshore energy infrastructure projects remains a matter that is reserved by the UK 
Government’, including how might it affect achievement of the Welsh Government’s goals 
for renewable and low carbon energy development and greenhouse gas reductions 
(NAWESC 2012, p.59)? 
The Welsh Government established the case for acquiring consenting powers as follows, 
linking together a number of rationales: 
‘We consider that executive powers to grant consent
11
 for large power stations ... 
should be a matter for the Welsh Ministers. We believe that it is anomalous that 
Wales is the only devolved administration in the UK not to have these powers, and 
under current arrangements we do not have the necessary tools to deliver our policy 
aspirations in an integrated and streamlined way’ (NAW Inquiry submission, para 37) 
A key rationaleis ‘parity’ i.e. asserting that the Welsh Government should, on the basis of an 
equal standing, have the same powers as devolved governments in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland. Beyond this, however, much argumentemphasised ‘delivery’. Evidence statements 
led withaccounts of the importance of major new energy infrastructureinvestment, in 
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Wales, to meeting EU, UK and Welsh decarbonisation objectives.This was linked to 
procedural arguments, that devolution of powers would help the Welsh Government to 
realise ‘a faster, more streamlined planning system’: in effect, by facilitating tighter 
procedural coordination (see also Welsh Government 2012).
12
Streamlining wasalso linked to 
greater responsiveness to territorial concerns, with the Welsh Government arguing that 
devolutionallowed the delivery of‘opportunities for the people of Wales’, with a ‘consenting 
regime that is both attuned to the issues of the region it serves and developed in response 
to the locally sensitive and specific planning guidance’ (para 38).  
Given the controversy around wind energy development, and the stymied progress of 
individual infrastructure projects, it is unsurprising that the NAW inquiry was dominated by 
voices critical of TAN8. Moreover, relatively few inquiry participants volunteered firm 
rationales for major energy consenting powers to be devolved.  
Although major energy companieswere known to differ in their attitudes to devolution, 
there was actually remarkable commonality in their inquirysubmissions. Industry actors 
almost invariably expressed ‘neutrality’
13
towards the allocation of powers: as Scottish 
Power Ltd explained, ‘we are keen to work positively ... with whichever consenting authority 
has responsibility for energy projects in Wales’ (para 9; see also RWE, West Coast 
Energy).Instead, narratives were dominated by specifying the qualities that any future zone 
of qualification should display. Echoing the Welsh Government, they emphasised that the 
UK renewable energy and decarbonisation targets required large-scale investment – ‘£200 
billion worth of investment is needed ... by 2020’ – and stated that ‘certainty and stability 
within the planning system is the critical factor in ... ensuring that these much needed 
projects are delivered’ (Scottish Power, op cit,para 9). Indeed, ‘without planning 
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applications being considered within a reasonable timescale, investors could ultimately turn 
to alternative markets where there is greater certainty’ (op. cit. para 7; see also RWE).Such 
threats were linked to criticisms that in Wales ‘the delivery of wind farm projects remains 
slow and unpredictable’ (REUK Cymru), with devolution presented as ‘complicating’ 
investment in Wales (RWE). 
This persistent stress on ‘certainty’ and ‘stable’ and ‘predictable’ regulatory regimes casts a 
warning over the extent of change that devolution should bring to the zone of qualification. 
Should devolution occur the Welsh Government was encouraged to create a consenting 
regime which resembled the 2008 Act system operating in England: i.e. decisions should be 
taken centrally in Wales by Welsh Government Ministers, not local authorities (REUK 
Cymru), and made swiftly within streamlined processes, with fixed time scales. Industry 
actors recognised that supporting TAN8 was integral to the present round of wind energy 
infrastructure investment – ‘we’ve got so much invested with it now, we have to support 
it’
14
 - but pressed for spatial guidanceto allow more spatial flexibility, like the NPS of the UK 
Government (Scottish Power; REUK Cymru). 
A central concern for many countryside NGOs and community groups was contesting grid 
and wind energy infrastructure and, relatedly, to see TAN8 reviewed, with arguments 
challenging its analytical weaknesses, legality and legitimacy.Pathologies with the blurred 
arrangements between Wales and England were also identified, with common themes being 
that the situation was ‘dysfunctional’: lackingconsistency andclarity, making coherent 
governance and public engagement difficult, and encouraging the trading of blame between 
Welsh and UK governments. Many articulated discourses of environmental injustice – for 
example, concern about Welsh landscapes ‘being the dumping ground for ill-conceived ... 
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energy policies of successive [UK] Governments’ (Volunteers for Abergorlech LLansawel and 
Rhydcymerau) – echoing the discourse of the Senedd protestors. But for few did greater 
autonomy for Wales presenta straightforward solution. Somelacked ‘faith in decision 
makers at Welsh Government level’ (Cambrian Mountains Society),felt that the ‘integrated 
electricity distribution network between England and Wales’ would undermine any scope 
for separate Welsh energy policy (Mochdre Action Group), or  argued instead that local 
voices should be more prominent (e.g. Montgomeryside Against Pylons). 
Among the more established environmental NGOs and statutory environmental bodies, 
references to ‘clarity’, ‘consistency’ and ‘coherence’ informed alternative arrangements for 
the zone of qualification. Devolution of consenting powers to Wales was presented 
positively for enabling greater territorial coherence in energy governance, in that a more 
comprehensive set of elements bound up with energy infrastructure – economic, 
environmental and social impacts; policy and delivery - could more readily be considered 
and coordinated. Procedural integration and comprehensiveness were the prime goals. 
Discourses of territorial coherence were often linked to a rebalancing of objectives within 
the zone this qualification, particularly that the form, location and quantity ofenergy 
development should be framed by the multiple qualities of Welsh territory rather thanby 
UK-wide market- and system-development logics.This environment-led rationale was 
expressed as giving greater weight to the ‘ecosystem services’ that Welsh environments 
provided (CPRW), or that siting decisions should be steered by environmental ‘limits’or 
‘capacity’ (Environmental Agency).
15
 
In their report, the majority of the Committee supported the Welsh Government ‘in its call 
for greater devolution of energy powers’, upholdinga conjunction of delivery and 
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accountability arguments, that acquiring additional powers over energy consenting will 
‘make the system simpler for developers’, ‘help local communities by being clear about who 
is responsible for what’, and facilitate the creation of ‘a single, streamlined and transparent 
process for Wales’ (NAWESC 2012, p.13). 
 
The Silk Commission 
Arguments developed for the NAWInquiry re-appeared, in reworked form, in the Silk 
Commission (e.g. Welsh Government 2013). Institutionally, however, the Silk Commission 
had a different governmental status. Whereas the NAW Inquirywas created by the National 
Assembly to scrutinise the Welsh Government, the Silk Commission was set up by the UK 
Government and tasked with examining the boundary between devolved and non-devolved 
powers, and recommending improvements. The contours of the zone of qualification 
around electricityinfrastructure were thus just one topic of consideration, alongsidefiscal 
powers, the case for a separate legal system, policing and so on. 
A further distinctive feature of the Silk Commission was the greater visibility of the UK 
government which, in its written and oral evidence
16
, presented a detailed articulation of 
the case for the status quo, thereby revealing the values that should discipline any calls for 
change. In a clear discourse overlap with major energy businesses, achieving the ‘UK’s 
transition’ to a low carbon energy mix required significant investment ‘across the country’, 
but therefore ‘(m)aintaining a strategic, single GB-wide approach is key to ensuring a stable, 
long-term policy framework to facilitate necessary private sector investment’. Again, we see 
consistency and stability being emphasised, but as qualities exemplified by current 
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arrangements: ‘(w)e consider that the current unified planning regime for England and 
Wales provides a stable platform for investment in major new infrastructure both now and 
in the future’. The UK Government also drew on the infrastructural inheritance to defend 
the status quo: ‘(e)nergy networks across the Welsh/English border are substantially 
integrated ... and maintaining a unified regime would facilitate further development of this 
important infrastructure’. The UK Government was implacable in seeing no merits – 
political, procedural or environmental – that were better served by giving powers to the 
Welsh Government. The current 50MW threshold was fine, as most schemes that are larger 
than this ‘are of sufficient importance and scale to be considered nationally significant’. The 
present regime was no less able to achieve accountability to local publics, to take account of 
TAN8, and to ‘balance local accountability and local impact with overall coherence and 
national need’. The frame of reference for ‘national’is the UK, with Welsh territoryviewed as 
integral but not distinctive. 
As at the NAW inquiry, energy companies expressed neutrality towards ‘constitutional 
issues’, but re-iterated that ‘(t)he key driver of the development of energy infrastructure 
projects is a long-term and stable regulatory environment’ (SSE, see also RWE). Significantly, 
by the time of the Silk inquiry established environmental organisations could also be found 
rationalising their longer-standing, pro-devolution arguments for environmentally 
integrated procedures with pro-business narratives of delivery. Thus, for statutory body 
Natural Resources Wales (NRW), devolution would enable comprehensiveness, 
simplification (by linking in consents for associated infrastructure, like substations), and 
making coordinated policy more achievable.  However, the merits of such moves were that 
‘any change in the devolution settlement needs to provide clarity, certainty and consistency 
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for developers and decision makers’. Bounding zones of qualification more clearly with 
Welsh territory were advantageous becausethis would both reduce ‘complexity and risk to 
delivery’, andenhance opportunities for energy policy to be ‘integrated with the needs of 
other activities and uses of our natural environment where those responsibilities are already 
devolved’. Other groups echoed these arguments (e.g. Royal Society for the Protection of 
Birds; FoE Cymru, Wales Trade Union Congress). 
 
4.3 (Re)creating boundaries 
At various points in this analysis, one can see how the effect of devolution within systems of 
energy infrastructure governance has been to raise awkward questions for the maintenance 
and bounding of zones of qualification. They featured in the emergent tensions between the 
spatial steering of TAN8 and the UK Government’s preferred approach to consenting. They 
reverberated through the arguments at the two inquiries, in which desires to construct a 
zone of qualification with ‘coherence’ and remove (undesirable) variation, was informed by 
perspectives that placed different goals and territories at their centre. Importantly, these 
positions are not easily amenable to technocratic mediation, in that there is no single metric 
that can easily weight their relative value, and bring them into alignment. 
So it proved for the Silk Commission which, in recommending improvements, sought to 
apply a diverse set of principles: accountability, clarity, coherence, collaboration, efficiency, 
equity and stability (Commission on Devolution in Wales 2014, 3.3.3). Full devolution of all 
energy infrastructure consenting powers was considered positive for enhancing the Welsh 
Government’s accountability for developments in Wales, and clarifying the role of planning 
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policy, but not to satisfy the principle of effectiveness: ‘a Wales-focussed energy strategy 
may not meet the needs of the wider United Kingdom’ (para 8.2.13), constructed again as 
achieving energy security. Instead, their recommendation was to increase the thresholds for 
energy generation project consents devolved to Wales to 350MW, onshore and offshore, 
with consenting for associated development like substations or grid connections aligned 
with whoever has responsibility for the main project.
17
 
One can see how dilemmas about how to balance diverse principles became translated into 
demarcations of physical, project scale. Indeed, the Silk Commission’s recommendations 
may have been strongly shaped by consideration of the particular infrastructure objects that 
ought to be governed at a Welsh level. A 350MW threshold embraced the majority of 
renewable energy schemes, including emerging ideas for tidal lagoons, but with ‘larger 
schemes of strategic importance to the United Kingdom remaining with the UK 
Government’ (para 8.2.20).However, assertions of ‘national’ or ‘strategic importance’ are 
not defined, and the compromises of the Silk position leave it vulnerable to further 
contestation. To understand whether it might hold, one needs to look at the ramifications of 
other boundary-creating and re-scaling processes outside Wales. 
In practice, the UK Government agreed swiftly to act on the Silk Commission’s 
recommendations, making provision for devolving electricity infrastructure consenting 
powers to Wales to be included in legislation (HM Government 2015). Given the UK 
Government’s implacable defence of the status quo, this move must be seen less as a 
Damascene conversion to the substantive arguments for Wales-level territorial integration 
than a response to the Scotland Independence Referendum of September 2014. This 
eventcreated intense concern among the major UK political parties about the management 
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of the unionof the UK, and raised the traction of Welsh Government calls for parity with 
Scotland (see Table 2). 
However, other shifts have kept the boundary of technological zones under contention. In 
England, public opposition to onshore wind increased in political salience with the formation 
of Conservative-dominated governments from 2010, more sensitive to rural electoral 
concerns, since when a series of steps have been taken to dismantle support for this 
technology (Cowell et al 2015). Market support for onshore wind energy (organised on a 
broadly UK-wide basis [Cowell et al. 2015]), has been reduced and scheduled for removal. In 
planning, large on-shore wind farms have been demoted from their status as ‘nationally 
important’ infrastructure, most significantly by moves to pass powers for consenting such 
projects over 50MW away from central government to local government, thus facilitating a 
diversity of local social and political responses to enter this zone of qualification. Such 
English ‘localism’, for wind energy, heightens the contrast with Welsh centralisation, as 
discussed further below (Barton 2015).  
 
5.0 Discussion –is re-scaling political? 
A starting proposition for this analysis was that analysing politics around the re-scaling of 
energy technological zones provides insights into obduracy and change in systems of 
provision. However, just because formal political institutions like national and devolved 
governments are involved, does not necessarily mean that energy infrastructure 
development has become significantly politicised. It remains important to assess which 
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objects have been brought ‘into the realm of contingency and deliberation’ (Hay 2007, cited 
in Kuzemko 2014, 262; Barry 2001) and which have not. 
In this case, within the technological zones of electricity infrastructure, attention has 
focused almost entirely on zones of qualification. Nobodyat the Wales inquiries suggested 
splitting the governance of electricity grid and distribution networks across the English-
Welsh border, and debate on the potential for unbundling market support for renewables 
to give some steering capacity to Wales has been limited. Disaggregating markets was not 
on the agenda. Contestation has focused on who should exercise consenting powers in 
Welsh territory, and how planning evaluations ofnew electricity generation and grid projects 
should be conducted. Indeed, the Welsh Government came to emphasise the absence of 
‘technical or engineering objections’ to its devolution aims (2013, 22; see van der Vleuten 
and Hogselius 2012). 
Across this sphere of discussion, the analysis has revealed ‘delivery of energy 
infrastructure’to be a master discourse. Narratives begin by stressing the scale and urgency 
of carbon reduction and renewable energy targets, extrapolated (often unquestioningly) to 
how much private sector investment is required to ‘deliver’ against these goals, then 
proceeding to specify the qualitiesrequired of a zone of qualification to be consistent with 
such investment. For many key actors, this required a system that can reach decisions 
swiftly, on large volumes of new capacity and thereby deliver certainty for private investors 
(Welsh Government 2012). This master discourse was used to justify different approaches 
to consenting, including those emphasising territorial integration with environmental, 
economic and social agendas in Wales, and to justify retaining the status quo or devolving 
powers to Wales. But that is the point; participants with different views on the reach and 
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organisation of the zone of qualification felt it necessary to explain how their preferred 
arrangements would support infrastructure delivery. Sovereignty principles were raised - in 
cross-examination Welsh Ministers often asserted stridently that ‘(t)he people of Wales 
have the right to manage their resources’
18
 - but such discourses are scarcer in written 
submissions.  
A second feature of the evidence is the relative absence of arguments that devolution of 
energy consenting powers to the Welsh Government could foster more radical sustainable 
energy pathways, based on smaller-scale, more de-centralised and diversely owned energy 
generation and demand management projects. These arguments were heard
19
, often from 
community and local environmental groups calling for alternatives to large-scale on-shore 
wind, but tended to be treated as an adjunct of the core concerns. Across the two inquiries, 
few parties argued that greater autonomy for Wales was desirableto enable effective 
resistance to industrial-scale fossil and nuclear energy generation: Friends of the Earth 
Cymru and Eco Cymru were rare exceptions.  In contrast to Scotland, where devolution has 
empowered Scottish Governments to resist new nuclear power stations in its 
territory(Cairney 2012), almost all the main parties to the NAW and Silk inquiries accepted 
that consenting powers for nuclear should reside with central government, and they 
attracted little discussion. 
A number of factors combined to delimit the space of contestation. Some are explicable in 
terms of traditional conceptions of agenda framing. The inquiry venues, formatsand remits 
framed the questions in narrow, often very instrumental terms; an example of how ‘external 
scrutiny’ can be managed in ways that do not increase wider reflexivity but channel it in 
particular directions (Barry 2002, 280). It is notable that groups opposing wind energy in 
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mid-Wales made use of political channels outside such institutions. In both inquiries, much 
emphasis was placed on the 50MW consenting threshold when, arguably, this has only 
partial relevance to orchestrating the kinds of infrastructure that a more decentralised 
energy pathway would entail. Indeed, some interviewees
20
 regarded the Welsh 
Government’s conflicts with the UK over the devolution of consenting powers as 
diversionary politicking, averting attention from what could be done with existing powers to 
knit together smaller scale sustainable electricity, heat, storage, demand management and 
transport.  
These outcomes also alert us to a wider analytical issue – the partiality of politics shaped by 
technology controversies. It is one thing to recognise that the materiality and social effects 
of infrastructure development can create controversy that gives rise to new actors and a 
multiplication of stakes (Callon et al 2009; Barry 2013a). TAN8 undoubtedly precipitated an 
array of effects and responses. However, this does not mean that a diverse array of 
alternative positionsautomatically appear and become organised into political processes. 
The wind energy controversy to date has illuminated the weak organisation of groups 
promoting radically different energy pathways in Wales; both the weak state of anti-nuclear 
politics and, echoing the rest of the UK, the tendency for community energy sector actors to 
be concerned mainly with facilitating local project development rather than changing 
structural policy (see Community Energy Wales submission to the NAW inquiry; also Seyfang 
and Haxeltine 2012). Opposition to the large-scale wind and grid projects in mid-Wales 
fomented a sense of injustice and desires to reverse these infrastructural developments 
(Mason and Milbourne 2014), but the wind-, project- and countryside-centred nature of 
these oppositional groups, and their focus on specific zones of qualification like TAN8, 
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meant that although they argued that alternative technologies should be given more 
consideration, cultivating alternatives was rarely central to their activities.If wind energy 
technology became political, the contours of the space of contestation were highly uneven. 
In this context, given the dominant emphasis on delivery, it is unsurprising that major 
energy companies have proven especially effective in mobilising their conceptions of how 
any future zone of qualification should work. They are incumbent actors in the technological 
zone, with major infrastructure projects already in the consenting pipeline.Energy business 
leaders have enjoyedimproved access to policy-making in Wales, within the inquiries and in 
other governance arenas,
21
 and an alignment of interests with the Welsh Government 
around green energy as a driver of job generation. One result is that the Welsh Government 
has been keen to use its planning powers to introduce streamlined and centralised 
consenting procedures, echoing UK norms (Welsh Government 2012; 2013): applying these 
to energy projects up to 350MW once legal provision for devolution is made, but also 
extending them to include projects of 25-50MW capacity (under the Planning [Wales] Act 
2015).   There also remains a keenness to simplify the multiple environmental and other 
consenting and licensing processes required for infrastructure development(NAWESC 2012, 
p.24-25; Welsh Government 2012b).
22
For all that the boundary-making processes discussed 
above were potentially open to allow a wider array of factors to enter the zone of 
qualification, the result is an intensification and narrowing of decision-making procedures 
for larger projects: around industry’s conception of clarity and consistency. 
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6.0 Conclusions 
The research presented here demonstrates the value of giving close attention to the 
intersection of politics and re-scalingin energy system transitions, ‘not simply as a 
contextual backdrop for energy policy, but as constitutive elements of change and 
continuity’ (Moss 2014, 1445). In Wales, we can see causal effects running in multiple 
directions. The 1998 devolution of planning policy powers enabled Welsh Governments, 
faced with public conflict around on-shore wind farms, to respond by creating new spatial 
strategies to steer the further expansion of these technologies. However, the subsequent 
up-scaling of infrastructural projects and impactsfurther problematised relations of 
accountability and control, creating pressures for change which – at the time of writing – 
was leading to the devolutionof major energy project consenting powers from the UK to 
Wales for the first time. 
Barry’s concept of technological zones has been shown to be useful for analysing what 
governance re-scaling entails when applied to infrastructural systems like energy, and for 
posing questions critical to understanding the scope for change.  The first set of questions is 
why ‘particular materials and sites’ come to be ‘of political significance’ (Barry 2014, 27) at 
particular times, while others do not? The materialities, sensory effects and siting geography 
of wind energy technologies have shown a propensity to disrupt existing environments and 
social and economic relations to them, creating conflicts, especially in rural areas, as have 
major high voltage grid projects (Szarka et al 2012). The political consequences of these 
conflicts undoubtedly threw some of the rules of the game into contention. Yet we can also 
see how contextual conditions shape the way in which technologies become political 
(Kuzemko 2014). The research has provided rare insights into the stance of business actors 
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in devolution processes. Although they expressed no wish to become involved in 
constitutional debates their framing of the scope for change around delivery proved very 
influential, notably on the way that the Welsh Government has chosen to organise its re-
territorialised zone of qualification. The research also provides an illustration of how more 
pervasive depoliticising narratives of crisis and decarbonisation (Flinders and Wood 2014; 
MacKerron 2009) become reproduced. However, the boundaries of technological zones 
across the English-Welsh border remain problematic, creating motors for further change; 
whether that is energy business leaders contemplating becoming more assertive advocates 
of devolution, to create spaces relatively insulated from the UK government’s reduced 
enthusiasm for renewables (Clubb 2015); or the NAW investigating the wider scope for 
energy transitions in Wales, in which the distribution of powers beyond infrastructure 
consenting are being questioned
23
. 
Focusing on the production of technological zones leads to a second set of questions, and 
one of the fundamental issues of infrastructural development, the extent to which it is 
possible or desirable to keep space – as territorial complexity – within bounds or at bay. As 
the research has shown, governments can respond to manage potential tensions between 
delivery and spatial complexity: in some instances adjusting zones of qualification to allow 
greater sensitivity to contextual conditions, perhaps allowing environmental constraints to 
define development trajectories; in others, seeking to keep such elements subordinate to 
‘strategic decisions’ about ‘need’, which emphasise the narrow instrumental goals of the 
infrastructure concerned (Cowell and Owens 2006; Cotton and Devine-Wright 2012). Such 
governance questions are not straightforwardly reducible to (or resolved) by adjusting the 
‘level’ at which powers may lie, sincethe case has shown that a re-scaling of authority 
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towards smaller-scale political units does not straightforwardly lead to increased political 
sensitivity to contextual conditions.   
The conceptual framework adopted here also suggests the wider importance of examining 
processes of boundary creation when addressing re-scaling. Barry (2001) explained how 
negotiating the edge or extensions of technological zones can be difficult, potentially 
admitting wider factors that disrupt the smooth circulation of entities within (Kama 2014), 
but the construction of new boundaries that can arise in processes of governance re-scaling 
creates analogous issues. Plural and incommensurable values may enter the equation 
(national sovereignty, market discipline, project delivery, environmental and social 
sensitivity); issues not easily accounted for within the neatening logics of actor network 
theory or governmentality. In such settings, border creation between spheres of jurisdiction 
may depend less on the simple application of principle than on the differentiation of 
objects, their problematisation and the significances attached to them (see also Faulkner 
2009). Debates in Wales over whether 25MW, 50MW or 350MW neatly demarcates what is 
‘nationally significant’ electricity infrastructure from the rest are an illustration of wider 
tendencies to arbitrate distinctions of value with claims about scale. Analysts of energy 
transition, and especially of the prospects of more decentralised energy solutions, may find 
it useful to view their research agenda in terms of how far new boundaries are created in 
technological zones, for countries, cities or communities; so too may analysts of political 
devolution. Seeing technological zones for systems of provision like energy as composite – 
bundling metrological, infrastructural and zone of qualification dimensions – also helps to 
decipher how notional moves towards local autonomy unfold alongside the maintenance of 
wider connections (van der Vleuten and Hogselius 2013). 
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Figure 1: The spatial strategy of Technical Advice Note 8 
 
 
Source: after WAG 2005. 
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Table 1: The dimensions of technological zones (after Barry 2006) 
• Metrological zones - common measurement standards to make information 
comparable; 
• Infrastructural zones - common connection standards so that systems of production, 
transmission and communication can be integrated; 
• Zones of qualification – processes of transparency and evaluation, to ensure that the 
qualities of objects and practices can be assessed, against more or less common criteria.   
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Table 2: Overview of the formal distribution of energy-related powers in the UK, 1998-2015 
 
Country Provision of 
market support for 
renewable energy 
Planning and 
consents 
 
(onshore) 
Planning and 
consents* 
 
(offshore) 
Economic 
development 
spending 
UK Govt. Full competence 
(for England, Wales 
and Scotland) 
Full policy competence 
for England, partial for 
Wales; full competence 
over major projects 
(50MW plus) 
Full competence for 
English and Welsh 
Waters (subject to 
Welsh exceptions, 
above) 
Competence for 
England 
Northern Ireland Fully devolved Fully devolved Fully devolved Fully devolved 
Scotland Scope to shape 
delivery of some 
schemes 
Fully devolved Fully devolved Fully devolved 
Wales No powers Partial powers over 
planning policy and 
consent for smaller 
schemes (below 50MW) 
Power to determine 
applications up to 
1MW (exception 
under Transport and 
Works Act 1992) 
Fully devolved 
 
*We set aside the issue of marine licensing powers, and consenting for onshore connections, for simplicity. The 
offshore regime applies principally to applications in UK territorial waters (i.e. up to 12 nautical miles and 
designated Renewable Energy Zones). 
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Table 3: Electricity Infrastructure Consenting Powers in Wales (August 2014) 
Energy Project Consenting Powers 
Generation onshore, of 50MW 
or below 
Local Planning Authority 
under Town and Country Planning Act 1990, unless called in or 
appealed following refusal 
Generation onshore over 
50MW 
Central Government 
for applications prior to 01.03.2010, under Electricity Act 
1989; post 01.03.2010 under the Planning Act 2008 as 
amended by Localism Act 2011 
Generation offshore of 1MW or 
less 
No consent needed 
Marine Licence determined by Natural Resources Wales up 
to 12 nautical miles; MMO beyond 12 nautical miles. 
Generation offshore 1MW to 
100MW 
Welsh Government 
under the Transport and Works Act 1992, or- 
Marine Management Organisation 
Under the Electricity Act 1989 
Generation offshore over 
100MW 
Central Government 
under the Planning Act 2008 as amended by Localism Act 
2011 
Grid network Central Government 
for applications of 132kV or over, under the Planning Act 
2008 as amended by Localism Act 2011; under 132kV under 
Electricity Act 1989; 
Substations Local Planning Authority 
under Town and Country Planning Legislation 
 
Source: for more detail, see NAWESC 2012, p60-62; Barton 2015. 
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